Ukraine, the weight of the human factor in the Russian offensive in Donbass- Corriere.it

“A lot of steel, a few soldiers” is the definition that experts Rob Lee and Michael Kaufman chose for him Description of the state of the army. This means that many armored vehicles and armored vehicles, without a sufficient number of soldiers: a situation that Chechnya also experienced in 1995. Various reforms introduced by the Russian defense are aimed at Create a power suitable for intense and short-lived campaignssupported – obviously – by “Queen of Fire”, artillery. The consequences were low-powered units. The brigade is supposed to have about 3,500 men of the rank of 2,500 and of those – taking into account 30% of the recruits – it means that only 1,700 are well prepared. Documents found by the Ukrainians revealed that on paper the famous tactical battalions included 700-900 military personnel In fact, they line up half of them: Many of the armored vehicles had a crew of 3, but they were without military personnel.

This explains why often Tanks were sent to the front without the necessary “escorts”. Legged faction, an indispensable stake to increase effectiveness and confront the enemy. Always because of the lack of “weapons”, Use Para Generals, Commandos and Landing Troops to the limit In roles usually assigned to infantry, he grew up later The role of the Wagner personnel. There is a problem with alternation, substitution and preparation. For this reason, not wanting to resort to general mobilization, The General Staff is trying to engage veterans (Older) by offering them a new contract with a higher salary.

Ukrainians used the territory and the army side by side. Around Kyiv the first component showed great skill, as well as in other regions where mobility was very important. The gas pressure in the east forced it to do so Transfer of reservists and land to the side of the “professional” unit: Not all of them – as evidenced by the stories emerging from the trenches – were ready for this kind of confrontation as they were heavily bombarded. Sometimes they did not have and do not have the means to repeat with the same density – ammo is low -, Some were more suited to fighting in defense of their landIn the literal sense: in the Lviv region there were protests by families against moving to the East.

Moreover, in the disputed territories of Donetsk and Lugansk, The situation is tragic: Zelensky himself admitted that losses amount to 60-100 soldiers per day, which is a huge amount and it is difficult to compensate them. The president specified that every Ukrainian soldier should have seven Russians. Severodonetsk under siegeUkrainian troops resisted despite the enemy artillery constantly falling, but were forced to retreat to more defensible positions. The General Staff hopes so Weapons from the West Changing the course of the fighting, allowing the enemy to turn back, as already happened in the north and in Kharkiv. However, the problems are not limited to Russian progress and supplies: in particular Weak coordination between the regular army and regional volunteers was highlightedwhich in some cases denounced the difference in treatment by Kyiv.

Compared to the first phase of the war, another aspect has changed: morale. At first, the Ukrainian Iron Will to Defend the Fatherland was opposed by the moodiness of the Russian troops, mostly young conscripts who were sent to the front without warning and without realizing that they would end up in the war, and that they did not obey. orders or ended up sabotaging their own means. this is Psychological imbalance between the influential forces -United basic help She received from the West, which revived the army, but also the soul – Zelensky’s army helped repel the attack in some areas of the country and stand up to the invaders. Now that the war has become a frictionthat the Russians are constantly bombing military and civilian targets exhausting the psychology of the resistance, and that the army has found its way to advance to Donbass, This “moral flaw” has somehow leveled itself out.

John Spencer and Lionel Benner wrote in Kyiv Post: Soldiers’ morale is more important than any weapon or military doctrineIt brings with it motivation, confidence, courage, tenacity and a sense of control over one’s destiny. Soldiers who fought for nearly three months In the tunnels of the Azovstal steel plant in Mariupol They were her symbol and inspired the resistance. “Although this is important, Morale is an elusive element And it is almost impossible to measure it: All good leaders try to grow itNot everyone succeeds, Spencer and Behner say.

The human factor also includes leadership. Kyiv and Moscow changed some leaders, because trust was broken, to try to change, to impose new lines. It is not an easy task for officers caught between personal responsibilities, pressure from the political leadership and obstacles on the ground. in the middle of may, Before the fall of MariupolZelensky, for example, replaced the regional head Yuri Halushkin with Ihor Tantsiura, a move that raised several questions. On the Russian front Instead, rumors of a replacement for General Dvornikov returned: He was to be replaced by Deputy Defense Minister Gennady Zhidko. Not a few of them paid their lives either, including the Russian generals Andrei Sukhovitsky, Vladimir Frolov, and Kanamat Potashev, to name the cases that have been proven. However, note on The New York Times Kaufman himself and Andrea Kendall Taylor, an analyst at the Center for a New American Security, “Appearances can be deceiving.”.

Many of the army’s initial failures were due to Putin’s belief – wrong – That the war would be short: The two analysts made it clear that Russian forces were neither prepared nor organized for a serious campaign. But in recent weeks, The Moscow army adapted and corrected some errors, highlighting the precarious state of Ukrainian resistance in some regions. Above all, however, The destructive power of the army was not affected by the warSubmarines, integrated missile systems, electronic capability and nuclear arsenal. This is what worries NATO and the United States more than anything else, argue Kaufman and Kendall Taylor, who both caution: Beware of underestimating the Russians.