BerlinTwo weeks after Ukraine’s surprise incursion into Russia, the Kremlin’s forces have succeeded in halting the enemy advance, strengthening the front line in the Kursk region, and preparing the next phase of a far-reaching battlefield policy for both sides. Russian President Vladimir Putin has promised a decisive response to the first invasion of Russian territory since World War II. But so far, the counteroffensive has focused on containing the advance rather than reversing it. That has raised the question of how much the depleted Russian military is willing to risk to drive the invaders out, or whether it is capable of doing so.
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The surprise invasion of Kursk exposed the Russian military’s persistent intelligence failures, as well as the lack of combat-ready reserves in a war fought on a 1,200-kilometer front. Ukraine’s rapid advance has also upended the world’s perception of Russia’s slow but unstoppable march to victory in a war of attrition.
But from a Russian perspective, Kyiv’s move also created an opportunity for the Kremlin to accelerate the attrition of Ukraine’s limited forces, make advances elsewhere on the front and turn that into a short-term political victory for Zelenskyy in a potential strategic defeat, at least according to Russian military analysts. Initially seen as a brilliant military maneuver, the operation could end up becoming a trap for the Ukrainian military, these analysts say.
The Russian advantage… in theory
“The invasion of Kursk has only extended and prolonged the war of attrition, in which Russia has a resource advantage,” says Vasily Kikkin, a political scientist at the Moscow State Higher School of Economics who studies the impact of the Russian war. Yet the battle in Russia’s border regions is still in its early stages, and Ukraine could still commit significant new reserves or launch another surprise offensive that would change the military and political calculus of the operation.
The Russian generals’ options include trying to assemble a new overwhelming force to crush the Ukrainian bridgehead at Kursk, or using their air and artillery superiority to gradually pound the defenders until they withdraw. But either strategy could take weeks, or even months, to complete, and would come at a cost elsewhere on the front, reflecting the reality of a war in which neither side has the resources to overthrow the other. Putin himself—who must balance the political costs of losing Russian territory with the cost of announcing a new round of civilian mobilization—has given few clues about his future strategy.
On August 6, undetected Ukrainian units repelled poorly equipped and inexperienced Russian conscripts sent to guard this section of the front and advanced dozens of kilometers into Russian territory. Even the Kremlin’s hawks acknowledged that the Ukrainian offensive had caught Russian forces by surprise. But some analysts believe that the Russian leadership did not send significant forces to this border area because it lacked obvious military value. “The strike came out of nowhere,” said Dmitry Kuznets, a specialist in Russian media. MedusaOperating from Latvia to avoid Kremlin censorship.
After a week of fighting, Ukraine claimed to control nearly 650 square kilometers of Russian territory and captured hundreds of prisoners. But as Ukraine’s supply lines strained and Russia brought in reinforcements, the advance slowed markedly in the second week. Now Russia had concentrated enough forces at Kursk to stop the invaders in the same kind of positional warfare that had developed elsewhere on the front.
Slow down attack
To counter the advance, the Russian command relied on a mix of conscripts, volunteers from new units formed in the rear at the time of the offensive, and experienced units drawn from relatively quiet sections of the front in Ukraine, according to Kuznets. For example, the Russian Black Sea Marines were transferred to Kursk from Kherson (Ukraine), where the front lies on the banks of the Dnieper River, which is difficult to cross. Other parts of the initial intervention force in Kursk arrived from Zaporizhia and Kharkiv, with fronts that had barely moved for weeks.
With the Kursk front stabilised, the Russian leadership is building up a new strike force for an eventual counteroffensive. Dmitry Kuznets believes that while Putin has time to plan his response, he cannot allow Russian territory to remain in enemy hands indefinitely without risking a nationalist backlash. Regional authorities have implicitly acknowledged that the battle to dislodge the Ukrainians could last weeks or months.
However, “if Ukraine hopes that the shock of the attack will make the Russians lose confidence in the prospects of war, that will not happen,” he said. now Political scientist Vasily Kikkin. “This is likely to lead to anger and acceptance that war was inevitable.” Since the invasion of Kursk, Russian forces have accelerated their advance toward the strategic stronghold of Pokrovsk in Donetsk. In recent days, they have also made advances in other parts of eastern Ukraine, where some of the most brutal fighting of the war has taken place.
The long-term impact of the Kursk invasion remains uncertain, but one thing is certain: it extended the front by another 60 kilometers, forcing both sides to stretch their limited forces even further. Ultimately, expanding the war into new areas may favor the side with more resources. And that side is still Russia.
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